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Reporting in the New York Times suggests a key element in the Trump administration's Russia-Ukraine peace plan involves Europe resuming Russian gas imports.
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Reporting in the New York Times suggests a key element in the Trump administration’s Russia-Ukraine peace plan involves Europe resuming Russian gas imports. This would represent a U-turn in the strategy pursued by the administration so far, which has promoted a concept of energy dominance that includes more US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to the EU, notably by pushing for the complete phase-out of Russian gas. The EU has since adopted legislation, preparing to halt all imports of Russian gas by the end of 2027.
This blog post looks at Washington’s efforts to promote higher Russian gas volumes to Europe at the expense of US LNG, the competition that would arise if Russian gas makes a comeback, and the hurdles standing in the way of getting supplies back to Europe. It argues that if the US reverses its current policy, it would essentially end up strengthening a competitor while leaving the main obstacles to European imports intact.
Since 2022, both the Biden and Trump administrations have supported more US LNG volumes replacing Russian gas in Europe, with the Trump administration working actively to solidify and institutionalize this trade shift.
The primary driver behind Europe’s gas pivot toward US LNG was Russia’s decision to cut pipeline gas supplies to Europe in 2022, forcing European countries to turn to alternative gas supplies, especially LNG. As a result, US LNG exports to EU countries quadrupled between 2021 and 2025. While this increase was largely the result of market forces—notably the flexibility of US LNG and attractive EU gas prices—it also benefitted from strong US political support.
The Biden administration set the initial momentum in March 2022 by announcing a rapid increase in US LNG exports to Europe. The Trump administration became more assertive, with LNG a key pillar of its “energy dominance” strategy. Washington pressured EU countries to stop buying Russian gas and import more US LNG instead. The EU-US Turnberry trade deal in July 2025 foresaw EU countries buying an average $250 billion per year of US energy over three years. In September 2025, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright pushed EU authorities to accelerate the timeline for halting Russian gas imports from the initial January 1, 2028, deadline to halting Russian LNG imports by January 1, 2027, and pipeline imports by September 30, 2027.
Another part of the diplomatic campaign focused on southeastern Europe, where Russia exported around 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) through the TurkStream pipeline in 2025. The Trump administration applied targeted bilateral diplomacy on southeastern European countries to turn to and sign long-term contracts for US LNG by promoting infrastructure projects such as the Vertical Gas Corridor, an initiative to expand gas transport from Greece into Central and Eastern Europe, and new LNG import terminals.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration lobbied the European Commission to delay or exempt US energy producers from import requirements under the EU Methane Regulation, emphasizing US LNG’s low-methane intensity.
Finally, legislative mechanisms such as the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 provided additional leverage to pressure buyers of Russian oil and gas (including Europeans) through the threat of secondary sanctions. However, on October 16, President Donald Trump issued an executive order waiving the application of sanctions, restrictions, and duties under the act.
A noted concern with this reversal, separate from US LNG industry competition, is that additional gas exports would increase Russia’s budget revenues. But the gains from LNG exports would be small, due to zero export-duty and extraction-tax exemptions. Budget revenues from pipeline gas exports could be material but would still be many times smaller than those generated by crude oil exports. Historically, oil has been the main source of Russia’s energy-related budget revenues, while gas exports have served primarily as a tool of geopolitical influence.
The US will continue to exert undisputed dominance over global LNG markets, thanks to growing LNG export capacity—up to 360 bcm/y by the early 2030s—and flexible LNG supplies. Europe, with its liberalized, transparent gas market and large import capacity, is a prized outlet for US LNG, given the shorter shipping distances and absence of maritime chokepoints compared to Asia.
The continuation of existing Russian gas supplies to EU countries (36 bcm in 2025) beyond 2027 would obviously reduce Europe`s need for replacement LNG. But a return to larger volumes of Russian pipeline gas to Europe, as the US peace plan seems to propose, would reduce LNG imports altogether, especially US LNG as the main source of flexible LNG. US cargoes could find other buyers, but stronger competition would put pressure on prices and make it harder to secure the contracts needed for further US LNG expansion.
Additionally, Russian President Vladimir Putin would certainly not stop at reviving pipeline exports to Europe. Removing US sanctions on Russian LNG projects such as Arctic LNG 2, Portovaya LNG, and Vysotsk LNG as well as enabling additional LNG projects under consideration (Ust-Luga LNG, Ob LNG, and Murmansk LNG) seems another likely component of these negotiations. Altogether, this could unlock almost 80 bcm/y of Russian LNG export capacity (subject to overcoming logistical, technical, and financial constraints) competing directly with US LNG interests.
This comes as questions are growing about long-term Southeast Asian LNG demand and China remains largely closed to US LNG exports. By helping Russia, Washington is undermining US LNG prospects in key markets.
Restoring large gas flows to Europe would require more than a political agreement between Washington and Moscow. Such a deal would not by itself remove EU sanctions on the Nord Stream pipeline, restrictions on Russian gas imports, or certification requirements for Nord Stream 2. Despite the support of some populist parties, most EU governments and the European Commission are against the return of Russian gas, given Russia’s recent hybrid attacks.
Nord Stream illustrates the problem. In September 2022, four explosions hit Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines connecting Russia and Germany, disabling three of four lines. The surviving 27.5 bcm/y Nord Stream 2 line has never operated commercially, and would need German certification and compliance with EU rules to do so. Fundamentally, the EU prohibits transactions involving Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2’s completion, operation, maintenance, and use. That restriction applies to the infrastructure itself, so changing its ownership would not remove it. Restoring damaged sections would also require technical assessments, financing, and repair work.
European companies have ownership and repayment rights that Washington and Moscow cannot simply disregard. European shareholders, including the Dutch gas network company Gasunie, own 49 percent of Nord Stream 1’s operator. Nord Stream 2 is wholly owned by Gazprom, but European lenders, including OMV and Uniper, helped finance its construction. These lenders are already trying to recover their money. OMV filed claims in Swiss proceedings, and Uniper continues to seek repayment of its loans despite having written them off in its accounts. Any acquisition would also have to account for the debt restructuring approved by a Swiss court in 2025.
Separate claims against Gazprom companies could also complicate a deal. Uniper won more than €13 billion against Gazprom Export for gas that was never delivered. Gasunie is enforcing a separate award against Gazprom under parent-company guarantees. If a sale or restart makes assets or payments belonging to relevant debtors accessible, they would have a clear incentive to pursue those funds. Where the awards can be enforced, creditors could seek court orders to seize sale proceeds or future payments. Their existing claims could delay a transaction, restrict its cash flows, and reduce the returns available to Russian participants.
Using other existing pipelines is challenging too. Reopening the Ukrainian route, for example, would require an agreement with Kyiv and repairs to infrastructure at the Sudzha metering station in the Russian region of Kursk that was destroyed in March 2025. And Gazprom stopped using the Yamal-Europe pipeline’s Polish section in 2022; it is highly unlikely that Poland would allow transit to resume.
Finally, while the EU’s gas phaseout regulation allows emergency suspension of the import ban for up to four weeks at a time, renewable while the emergency persists, it is limited to short-term contracts. These also do not override the separate sanctions ban on Russian LNG.
For Washington, the contradiction is clear: after pressing Europe to replace Russian gas with US LNG, it would now be helping Moscow rebuild a competing export business. Such a policy would strengthen Russia’s position in global gas markets while working against the US LNG expansion at the heart of the Trump administration’s energy dominance agenda. The return of Russian gas in Europe would also require populist parties to come to power in enough countries to remove the current sanctions.
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