Cheniere Energy Ramps Up Lobbying on LNG Exports
Cheniere Energy intensifies Capitol Hill lobbying on LNG exports amid tariffs and tax changes. Discover the industry's key policy priorities.
Summary by Vivek Shastry & Jonathan Elkind • July 22, 2026
This event summary reflects the authors’ understanding of key points made in the course of discussions among members of the first meeting of the High-Level Panel on Universal Energy Abundance. This summary does not necessarily represent the views of any individual participant, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Center on Global Energy Policy, or Columbia University. The summary may be subject to further revision. The Center on Global Energy Policy would like to thank the Rockefeller Foundation for its grant in support of the work of the High-Level Panel.
The High-Level Panel on Universal Energy Abundance was formed in April 2026 by the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA to facilitate low- and middle-income countries’ development of reliable and affordable energy scaled to enable industrialization, job creation, and broad socio-economic transformation. The Panel consists of 17 people with extensive experience in a variety of areas and sectors: government, finance, multilateral institutions, industry, and energy.[i]
The Panel’s first convening took place at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Center in Italy on May 26–27, 2026, against the backdrop of turbulence in energy markets caused by the US-Israeli war in Iran. At its peak, the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz halted ship-borne flows of approximately 20% of global crude oil and refined products and 20% of global cargoes of liquefied natural gas (LNG)[ii] as well as other hydrocarbon-derived commodities such as ammonia, fertilizers, cooking gas (liquefied petroleum gas), and helium. Panel members acknowledged the acute challenges created by the war but expressed the view that discussing strategic objectives like universal energy abundance was timely regardless.
Key Discussion Points
The discussions in this first convening were organized around six themes: (1) the case for UEA as a strategic priority, (2) approaches to operationalize UEA, (3) policy tensions complicating UEA, (4) measuring progress, (5) pathways for different country categories, and (6) the fitness of current institutions and instruments to deliver UEA. Main elements of each section of the agenda are detailed below.
The most consistent theme across both days of discussion was the need for energy systems to meet the rising developmental ambitions in LMICs. Participants agreed that existing programs to promote energy access and related tracking of progress are vitally important. More than 650 million people around the globe lack access to electricity, and roughly two billion rely on harmful cooking fuels such as charcoal or traditional biomass.[iii] But participants said current frameworks focusing on energy access aim to deliver only a fraction of average electricity consumption in middle-income economies, to say nothing of high-income economies. Moreover, insufficient reliability of electricity supply throttles opportunity, even for those who are technically “connected.”
Participants stressed the importance of delivering universal energy abundance—not simply electricity abundance. Electricity represents less than 20% of total global energy consumption, and while electricity’s share of total energy is rising, it is likely to remain the lesser of total energy consumption for many decades. Key industrial processes that require very high heat, such as cement and steel production, metals processing, and certain chemicals manufacturing cannot yet be cost-effectively electrified in many locations. A credible framework for UEA, participants argued, must encompass all forms of energy.
On the question of how to operationalize UEA, the Panel emphasized the importance of integrating high-quality energy system planning and economic planning at regional, national, and sub-national levels. Participants emphasized that energy strategies implemented without coordination with industrial, agricultural, water, and transport policies tend to fail. To build energy systems, other infrastructure (e.g., financial architecture, ports, roads, and/or rails) is required, and energy infrastructure requires credit-worthy consumers to make the energy investments financially viable.
One participant suggested, and a number of participants supported, the idea of a five-tier hierarchy of energy needs as a useful planning framework: (1) households (including for clean cooking); (2) small and medium enterprises and distributed grids; (3) transportation systems, including passenger and freight mobility; (4) social services, including health facilities, water and sanitation, and supply chains; and (5) large-scale industrialization, including mineral corridors, materials processing, and economic clusters. Each tier implies different energy supply requirements, different financing needs and structures, and different delivery mechanisms.
As far as effective planning is concerned, several participants noted that existing, country-developed master plans (such as the Mission 300 Compacts[iv] or regional power pool plans) provide an important baseline. National decision-makers could, for example, assess where those existing plans fall short of the goal of delivering UEA and identify additional investments needed to close that gap.
Participants also discussed the importance and challenge of corridor-based planning. For example, the Lobito Corridor—linking the DRC and Zambia to the Angolan coast—was cited as a promising model where energy, mining, and industrial development are designed and financed in a coordinated fashion rather than pursued independently. Participants said the Simandou iron ore project in Guinea offers a cautionary example, where relevant parties developed an integrated framework but national political choices raised the costs and reduced the regional benefits that could have been shared with neighboring countries.
Several participants raised the “chicken and egg” problem: energy supply requires demand to be commercially viable, while industrial development requires energy supply as a prerequisite. Breaking this cycle requires, in many cases, a credible base off-taker—often a mining company, a manufacturing facility, or a large agricultural processor—that can commit to purchasing enough power to justify the needed generation, transmission, and distribution investments.
Participants discussed the possibility that, in building toward universal energy abundance, countries might encounter tensions between competing policy priorities. A few participants, for example, argued that countries seeking to scale up reliable and affordable energy systems without simultaneously prioritizing sustainability and especially climate goals made no sense in a world where many national governments still aim to achieve net-zero climate objectives by mid-century. Other Panel members argued that decision-makers in many LMICs would appropriately attach higher priority to having affordable and reliable energy for growth than to meeting certain climate goals. One participant said that Africa currently accounts for approximately 2.8 percent of global cumulative carbon dioxide emissions, and, according to the International Energy Agency, developing all of Africa’s discovered natural gas resources would bring that cumulative figure only to approximately 3.5 percent in 2030.[v] And other participants noted that resistance to financing the development of gas resources in Africa could not only be counterproductive to growth but also to climate goals, since the alternative scenario would likely be consumption of timber or coal, or continued energy deprivation.
Many members of the High-Level Panel agreed that whatever they individually thought about the merits of LMICs tapping new or existing natural gas production, or even coal-fired power plants, the weighing of priorities could only occur effectively within a given country’s decision-making structures. Tradeoffs over policy priorities, most Panel members agreed, are situation-specific. They said some LMIC decision-makers could benefit from authoritative sources of data on technology choices available for achieving UEA to evaluate options in relation to national objectives, and that such evaluations could reveal win-win outcomes where sustainable solutions also deliver needed energy in a timely manner.
Participants debated how to measure progress toward universal energy abundance in a form understandable to the general public, political leaders, and investors or businesspeople. Many participants argued that a metric that relies on esoteric units of energy consumption would be incomprehensible to non-specialists. And some noted that using a single, energy-consumption-oriented metric would suggest that more consumption is the intended objective rather than productive and efficient use of energy to raise living standards and provide jobs and opportunity. In the end, participants generally supported the goal of a simple, “headline” metric, with some arguing in favor of reinforcing that headline with a dashboard showing other relevant data such as distributional equity (e.g., the number of people lacking energy access), energy intensity of output, greenhouse gas emissions, affordability and reliability, and/or resilience or industrial energy use.
Most participants agreed that it is important to measure progress toward UEA with a metric(s) that tracks energy, not just electric power. Most current frameworks, such as the Multi-Tier Framework[vi] and the Modern Energy Minimum,[vii] track progress using kilowatt-hours (kWh) per capita, a measure of electrical consumption.
Participants supported the proposal from one Panel member to employ a gigajoule (GJ) per capita metric, as it would reflect total energy use. Geographic disparities in this measure of total energy use are quite stark: Chad, for example, uses about 1.3 GJ per capita per year; Africa averages 14 GJ; India 28 GJ; Europe 127 GJ; the United States 275 GJ; and Qatar 770 GJ.[viii] Some participants suggested that the Panel argue for a floor of 40 GJ/capita/year as the level above which basic developmental objectives can be met, and 100 GJ/capita/year as a target consistent with enabling a good quality of life, which is comparable to the average across Europe. Participants widely agreed that any metric employed to measure progress must also be explained in terms that are easily comprehensible to national leaders and citizens.
The objective of the High-Level Panel, to help every low- or middle-income country achieve universal energy abundance, is a challenging task given countries’ different starting points and needs. Across the globe, roughly 130 countries qualify as LMICs,[ix] and one-size-fits-all prescriptions will not address widely different circumstances. Several participants proposed accounting for these real-world variations by grouping countries by current energy consumption levels based on the formerly mentioned GJ metric, combined with the resources, institutions, and financing capacity they have available. Some others disagreed with the idea of grouping countries as a way to address this problem because, they argued, every country’s situation is unique.
Despite inherent challenges, some LMICs have already achieved energy abundance. Skillfully implemented industrial policy—deliberately sequencing investments to tap into global value chains—was highlighted as an important tool for development of a country’s energy sector and its wider economy. In fact, several participants said industrial policy has played a vital role in a number of countries that have accomplished rapid energy-enabled growth, including China, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, and the East Asian industrial economies.
Several participants noted that sub-national variation also matters. For example, Nigeria’s Lagos State alone has a GDP comparable to many individual African countries. Energy profiles in major urban and industrial centers can also differ dramatically from national averages. So a framework that only speaks to national averages can miss important patterns in both the problem and the solution.
Panel members offered candid assessments, based on their individual professional experiences, of why existing institutional arrangements often seem unable to deliver the investments needed for UEA. Participants said most multilateral development banks (MDBs) move far too slowly. One participant noted that certain MDB climate funds can easily take seven years to disburse funds—and they often compete with private capital rather than complement or coordinate with it. And national development finance institutions sometimes seek profits from projects that, by design, are not profit-oriented, such as certain public sector infrastructure.
Participants identified factors that can enable greater private capital flows to LMICs:
As the first convening of the High-Level Panel, the Bellagio meeting made clear that universal energy abundance is not simply an extension of today’s important work on energy access. Instead, UEA is a broader development objective focusing on reliable, affordable, and ideally sustainable energy to enable growth in jobs, industry, public services, and socio-economic opportunity. Participants converged on the need to think beyond electricity alone, to link energy planning more closely with industrial strategy and finance, and to ground the conversation in clear metrics and practical implementation pathways. At the same time, important questions remain open — including how to tailor pathways to different country contexts, and how to mobilize institutions and capital at the speed and scale required. These questions will frame the deliberations in subsequent convenings of the High-Level Panel, which will occur in the autumn of 2026, spring of 2027, and autumn of 2027.
[i] For more background on the High-Level Panel on Universal Energy Abundance, see: https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/center-on-global-energy-policy-rockefeller-foundation-create-new-high-level-panel-on-universal-energy-abundance/.
[ii] US Energy Information Administration, “World Oil Transit Chokepoints,” March 3, 2026, accessed on July 9, 2026, https://www.eia.gov/international/analysis/special-topics/world_oil_transit_Chokepoints.
[iii] International Energy Agency, “655 million people still living without electricity underscore urgent need to deliver on universal energy access target,” June 24, 2026, https://www.iea.org/news/655-million-people-still-living-without-electricity-underscore-urgent-need-to-deliver-on-universal-energy-access-target.
[iv] World Bank Group and African Development Bank, Mission 300, “Compacts,” accessed July 8, 2026, https://mission300africa.org/compacts/.
[v] International Energy Agency, “Key Findings,” Africa Energy Outlook 2022, June 2022 (revised May 2023), https://www.iea.org/reports/africa-energy-outlook-2022/key-findings.
[vi] The Multi-Tier Framework, developed by the World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), replaces binary energy access metrics with a multidimensional six-tier system that evaluates electricity and cooking services based on attributes including capacity, reliability, affordability, and safety. See: ESMAP, “The Multi-Tier Framework for Energy Access: Insights and Impact from a Decade of Surveys,” World Bank, March 31, 2026, https://www.esmap.org/publications/multi-tier-framework-energy-access-insights-and-impact-decade-surveys.
[vii] The Modern Energy Minimum, developed by the Energy for Growth Hub, proposes to establish a global energy consumption benchmark of 1,000 kWh per person per year—estimated as 300 kWh of electricity for household use and 700 kWh for industrial and commercial use. See: Energy for Growth Hub, accessed July 8, 2026, https://modernenergyminimum.org/.
[viii] Derived from: Our World in Data, “Energy use per person” table, accessed July 8, 2026, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/per-capita-energy-use?tab=table&time=latest.
[ix] The World Bank Group tracks income levels and updates its category thresholds on a regular basis, so the number of LMICs changes from year to year. For more, see: World Bank Group, Data, “Low & middle income,” accessed July 8, 2026, https://data.worldbank.org/country/low-and-middle-income.
The economic and humanitarian consequences of the June 24 twin earthquakes in Venezuela continue to emerge.
Full report
Summary by Vivek Shastry & Jonathan Elkind • July 22, 2026