News

Explore our expert insights and analysis in leading energy and climate news stories.

Energy Explained

Get the latest as our experts share their insights on global energy policy.

Podcasts

Hear in-depth conversations with the world’s top energy and climate leaders from government, business, academia, and civil society.

Events

Find out more about our upcoming and past events.

About Us

We are the premier hub and policy institution for global energy thought leadership. Energy impacts every element of our lives, and our trusted fact-based research informs the decisions that affect all of us.

Critical Minerals

Five Key Decisions to Revitalize US Critical Mineral Stockpiles

Reports by Tom Moerenhout, Cina Vazir & Irina Patrahau • July 09, 2025

This report represents the research and views of the authors. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Center on Global Energy Policy. The piece may be subject to further revision.

Contributions to SIPA for the benefit of CGEP are general use gifts, which gives the Center discretion in how it allocates these funds. More information is available here. Rare cases of sponsored projects are clearly indicated.

CGEP’s Visionary Annual Circle

Corporate Partnerships
Occidental Petroleum Corporation
Tellurian Inc.

Foundations and Individual Donors
Anonymous
Anonymous
Aphorism Foundation
the bedari collective
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation
David Leuschen
Mike and Sofia Segal
Kimberly and Scott Sheffield
Bernard and Anne Spitzer Charitable Trust
Ray Rothrock

Executive Summary

The United States is at a pivotal moment to modernize its approach to critical mineral stockpiling. Minerals are increasingly central to American strategic interests, yet the US remains heavily reliant on foreign suppliers, particularly China, for processed materials. This dependency exposes the US to major vulnerabilities in national, economic, and climate security. The National Defense Stockpile (NDS) can be a key policy lever to reduce these vulnerabilities. At present, however, the NDS is underfunded, covering only a fraction of projected needs in a national emergency. It also may not be realizing its potential to address underlying market failures that threaten US economic interests in addition to its historical defense role.

This report, part of the Critical Materials Initiative at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA, finds that an economic stockpile with market-shaping quantities of material may cost more than six times the amount of a defense-oriented stockpile. It is therefore important to integrate stockpiling choices into the wider array of policy options, analyzing whether a stockpile is the most efficient tool to address the specific market failure at hand for each material and transaction.

The report outlines five foundational choices if a stockpiling strategy is adopted, as bipartisan support suggests is possible, and offers related recommendations for US policymakers designing such a system:

  1. Clarify the stockpile objectives: The United States would need to decide whether its stockpile would serve national defense exclusively or also aim to stabilize markets and support key industries. International examples from China, Korea, and Japan show that it is possible to serve dual interests. A wider mandate for the NDS could expand its objectives to include reducing price volatility, supporting responsible supply chains, and de-risking capital investment.
  2. Choose which minerals to stockpile: The US currently uses lists from the US Geological Survey, Department of Energy, and Department of Defense to determine which materials are critical and potentially worth stockpiling. It is crucial to regularly align and update these lists. A tiered approach could distinguish between bulk/base metals, battery materials, and niche metals (for which high-impact, low-cost opportunities exist). It can also phase acquisitions to avoid distorting markets and inflating acquisition costs.
  3. Decide which processing stage to stockpile for each mineral: Stockpiling ores offers flexibility but assumes domestic processing and refining capacity that the US lacks for most minerals. Refined products, despite higher costs and storage complexity, are more useful in times of crisis. The US could prioritize stockpiling refined products in the short term while accelerating investments in allied processing infrastructure.
  4. Formalize the management system: Stockpiles can be managed by the federal government, semi-independent agencies, or private industry under mandate—or some mix of the three. Korea and Japan use hybrid models, combining public stockpiles with voluntary or mandatory private reserves. The US can adopt a similar structure that balances public control with industry participation, including the use of offtake contracts and emergency release mechanisms.
  5. Weigh stockpile costs against depth: Acquisition costs will rise significantly as global demand for minerals increases. Strategic use of instruments like forward contracts, contracts-for-difference, and advance purchase agreements can help manage costs for a market-shaping stockpile while still incentivizing new supply.

The US would need to ensure that the NDS is properly funded to meet its current mandate before considering expanding its scope to industrial resilience and economic security, which would require additional sustained investment over decades rather than a one-off appropriation. But the country does face an important window to align mineral stockpiles with the strategic landscape of the 21st century. A well-designed system can reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, support domestic and allied industries, and enhance America’s geopolitical leverage.

Our Work

Relevant
Publications

The international trade dimensions of the United States critical minerals security strategy

This paper examines the trade dimensions of the policy instruments employed by the United States to secure critical minerals supply chains. Drawing on policy statements, executive orders, tariff schedules, and six bilateral critical minerals agreements announced in 2025, it assesses how US trade policy has been repurposed to advance supply-chain security objectives. The paper finds that recent US initiatives reflect bipartisan trends in reconfiguring trade policy that predate the Trump administration, even as they introduce new and consequential trade coordination mechanisms that operate outside the World Trade Organization and beyond conventional free trade agreements. Specifically, US critical minerals security strategy now relies on a differentiated set of sector-specific arrangements that combine familiar elements of US international economic engagement with more novel features that increasingly utilize trade policy instruments. What distinguishes these six minerals deals is their systematic coupling with parallel reciprocal trade negotiations, their incorporation of an explicitly ‘America First’ approach to reciprocity, the absence of a clear ideological hierarchy among partner countries, an emphasis on domestic processing and industrialization, and the growing use of exclusion mechanisms targeting third-party actors. The recurrence of these novel elements across diverse minerals deals suggests deliberate design rather than ad hoc experimentation that may have durable restructuring effects across global mineral supply chains. The paper concludes by outlining implications for US policy makers, for partner countries—particularly mineral-producing low- and middle-income economies—and for the architecture of the global trading system.

External Publications with Zainab Usman UNU-WIDER • April 01, 2026
The international trade dimensions of the United States critical minerals security strategy
See All Work
Critical Minerals

Five Key Decisions to Revitalize US Critical Mineral Stockpiles

Reports by Tom Moerenhout, Cina Vazir & Irina Patrahau • July 09, 2025