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This event report reflects the authors’ understanding of the most salient takeaways that emerged from the discussions. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Center on Global Energy Policy or any individual participant or cosponsoring organization. The event report may be subject to further revision.
The Center on Global Energy Policy would like to thank the BMW Foundation and Breakthrough Energy for their support of the dialogue and the Trade and Clean Energy Transition program. More information is available here.
In the fall of 2024, the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) at Columbia University SIPA launched the International Dialogue on Climate and Trade to afford governments and stakeholders opportunities to seek common ground on ways of more effectively and equitably managing issues at the intersection of climate and trade.
Phase one of the dialogue involved regional workshops in Brazil, Singapore, and South Africa that included more than 100 participants from 22 governments, as well as academia, think tanks, the private sector, labor, and civil society. The discussions focused on the sources of rising tension at the climate-trade interface and identified potential pathways for cooperative action to better align climate and trade objectives. The workshops were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, though participants agreed to be identified (see the Appendix).
Trade is an essential enabler of climate action—there is no path to net zero without leveraging trade. Increasingly, however, trade and climate objectives are colliding. As major powers pursue green industrial policies to drive decarbonization and grow their low-carbon industries, other countries fear that the resulting trade impacts may disadvantage them in the global net-zero transition.
In surveying perspectives among government officials, stakeholders, and experts, the dialogue found widespread concern across geographies and spheres that climate-trade conflicts, if allowed to escalate, will increasingly pose obstacles to trade and to achieving countries’ climate, economic, and development ambitions.
The potential for climate policies to affect trade flows was anticipated at the very start of the global climate effort. The 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the agreed foundation for that effort, cautions that such measures “should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”[1]
These long-latent tensions are now open conflicts, triggered largely by the green industrial policies of major powers, including China, Europe, and, until recently, the United States. These policies, which include clean energy subsidies, green standards, and carbon border measures, are designed, at least in part, to decarbonize economies, including by preventing carbon leakage. But, as participants noted, most are equally shaped by economic objectives—creating jobs and protecting or strengthening national competitiveness. Many also are justified on energy and national security grounds, particularly as they relate to securing supply chains and critical minerals.
Some dialogue participants emphasized how, in domestic political contexts, this “bundling” of priorities has been important in helping establish and sustain political support for strong climate action. Beyond potential domestic benefits, it was noted that green industrial policies can have positive cross-border spillover effects by lowering the cost of clean technologies and creating incentives for stronger climate action globally.
As economic levers, however, these policies bear invariably, and in some cases by design, on international trade flows. As was evident in the course of the dialogue, the central issues now arising are whether these policies and their impacts are on balance fair and are in keeping with countries’ climate and trade obligations. Countries potentially disadvantaged by these trade-related climate policies—whether developed, emerging, or developing—question whether they are a form of “green protectionism” that makes it harder for them to attract investment and compete in the clean energy and the broader net-zero transition.
As countries strengthen and implement their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, differences in levels of ambition are likely to continue to be reflected in differences in compliance costs among economies, raising the risks of carbon leakage and the need for policies to address them.
Climate-trade conflicts are arising against a global backdrop of increased fragmentation, weakening trade norms, and deepening geopolitical rivalries, amplified by the present US administration’s aggressive trade policies.
Dialogue participants observed that climate-trade tensions are arriving at a time when the global order as a whole faces unprecedented stress. They also recognized that established norms and processes were fraying even ahead of the United States’ wholesale retreat from international alliances and agreements, with countries beginning to tilt toward unilateral action rather than multilateral solutions.
In the trade sphere, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is virtually paralyzed, while a wider array of political, strategic, and economic forces contributes to the fragmentation of global trade. Deepening geopolitical rivalries, meanwhile, have bred economic nationalism tied in some cases to national security agendas.[2] Climate-trade tensions arise within—and have become deeply enmeshed with—this broader geopolitical context. Green industrial policies aimed at securing clean energy supply chains, for instance, may be as often instruments of economic and national security as enablers of climate action.
Some participants saw the recent actions of the Trump administration, including foremost its weaponization of trade, as further undermining the feasibility of rules-based cooperation and injecting new uncertainties into the evolving geopolitical order. Yet there was broad recognition within the dialogue that climate-trade tensions will remain a class of issues that countries must seek to address cooperatively and pragmatically regardless of the course of broader events.
If allowed to escalate, climate-trade tensions threaten to undermine countries’ climate, trade, and development objectives. Alternatively, closer cooperation can help unlock climate-aligned trade and investment, opening significant economic opportunities for many countries.
Dialogue participants expressed strong concern that present climate-trade antagonisms could significantly escalate, potentially triggering a rising spiral of export bans, countervailing duties, and other retaliatory measures. Growing barriers and fragmentation could impede investment and trade in the raw materials, technologies, and infrastructure needed to decarbonize economies, while also harming many countries’ broader economic and development interests. Developing countries, in particular, are deeply concerned that they could find it harder to access global markets and face further obstacles to climate finance.
Conversely, dialogue participants saw significant benefits in closer cooperation among governments at the climate-trade interface. Apart from encouraging a generally freer flow of decarbonizing goods and services, such cooperation could help countries and regions address key needs and priorities and secure a stronger footing in the net-zero transition. Cited examples include developing an integrated ASEAN power grid, which would support regional energy security and decarbonization; critical mineral reserves in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in ways that enable these regions to contribute on equitable terms to the clean-energy transition; greenhouse gas standards in carbon-intensive sectors that incentivize and reward production in regions with natural clean power assets; and green industrialization and regional value chains within the African Continental Free Trade Area to help strengthen Africa’s position in the net-zero transition.
While many emerging and developing countries are now fashioning their own forms of green industrial policy to better position their industries and economies, dialogue participants observed that fully realizing such opportunities will require overcoming a broader array of obstacles, including inadequate capacity, infrastructure and investment flows, high finance costs, and heavy tax and debt burdens.
Climate-trade tensions stem in part from long-standing frictions between developed and developing countries over the equity impacts of both climate change and countries’ responses to it.
The emerging clashes between climate and trade are to some degree a manifestation of the struggle over equity and fairness at the core of global climate debate since its very start. Dialogue participants noted that, broadly speaking, developing countries, which historically contributed less to global warming than developed countries, are at the same time more vulnerable to climate impacts and have less capacity for climate mitigation and adaptation. These equity considerations are reflected in the core UNFCCC principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR), amended in subsequent agreements with the phrases “and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC) and “in the light of different national circumstances,” largely in recognition of the significant economic advances made by many developing countries since the launch of the climate effort. Differing interpretations of this principle, and differing views on the continuing relevance of the historic distinction between developed and developing countries, remain central to UNFCCC negotiations.
Within the trade realm, the related WTO principle of Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) for countries at earlier stages of development has been reflected across trade agreements in provisions granting developing countries longer implementation timelines, greater flexibility in commitments, and preferential market access. Some developed countries are now contesting the application of S&DT and pressing for stricter eligibility criteria.
Against this backdrop, some participants viewed negative spillovers from unilateral climate measures as a further form of climate inequity. Many in the Global South view green industrial policies in the North as inherently trade-distorting, concentrating green investment in developed countries and placing developing countries at a competitive disadvantage in the net-zero transition. Some view these policies as an alternative de facto trade framework that defies established multilateral norms and shifts climate burdens to the South.
Dialogue participants cited the following specific concerns: many developing countries lack the fiscal capacity to compete on green subsidies; many lack technical, financial, and institutional capacity to meet new green trade requirements (e.g., traceability systems, product-level emissions tracking, and standards compliance); and many believe their industries and exports are penalized by standards that don’t accommodate regional differences by, for instance, failing to fully credit the decarbonization benefits of biomass and hydropower. Participants in the Brazil workshop spoke of the need to “tropicalize” green standards.
Other dialogue participants, while acknowledging potential equity impacts, viewed trade-related climate policies as fully within the nature of NDCs under the Paris Agreement and the right of countries to undertake trade-restrictive measures, provided they are not arbitrary, unjustifiable, or disguised trade restrictions. With respect to specific policies, discussions in some cases are emerging over potential adjustments to better address developing country concerns, the most prominent example being the European Union’s recent streamlining of its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
Climate-trade conflicts have begun playing out in respective multilateral settings—the UNFCCC and the WTO—but with little prospect of meaningful near-term resolutions.
At the two most recent UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties (COPs), developing countries pushed strenuously but without success to place “unilateral trade measures” on the negotiating agenda. One modest step at COP29 was the addition of an item to the workplan of the UNFCCC body addressing “response measures”—to “analyse, assess and report on the impacts of measures taken to combat climate change, including cross-border impacts.”[3] However, given the politically charged nature of the issues, as well as the need for decisions to be taken by consensus, the UNFCCC appears unlikely to make substantive progress on climate-trade conflicts.
At the WTO, climate-trade issues are a growing focus of discussion within the standing Committee on Trade and Environment and the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions launched in 2020. They also are arising in formal challenges to members’ policies, including Russia’s recent challenge to the EU CBAM and China’s complaint against US tariffs on electric vehicles, batteries, and other clean-energy goods.[4]
Yet there was broad recognition within the dialogue that, as presently configured, the trade system is not well suited to reconciling climate and trade. As the participants discussed, the regime lacks clear rules for weighing a policy’s climate benefit against its impact on trade (e.g., the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures focuses solely on the trade effects of subsidies and allows no exceptions or balancing for climate or sustainability purposes[5]). More fundamentally, the WTO regime remains institutionally and politically hamstrung , with little near-term prospect of reviving its appellate function.
As climate-trade issues naturally pertain to both regimes, countries can argue in one regime that they should instead be taken up in the other. The picture that emerges from the dialogue, however, is that the issues fit squarely within neither but rather fall between them. While participants saw continued discussions within the WTO and UNFCCC as a valuable means of clarifying views and establishing a shared knowledge base, they had little expectation that either regime would produce tangible outcomes in the foreseeable future.
Outside the UNFCCC and WTO, countries have begun to take up issues at the intersection of climate and trade in a growing number of plurilateral and ad hoc forums—undertaking analysis, examining policy options, outlining principles, and establishing binding commitments.
Dialogue participants reported on a growing array of efforts among governments touching on issues at the climate-trade interface. The initiatives vary in character and intent; taken together, they suggest a possible hierarchy or progression of efforts.
As one example at the bilateral level, the Australia-Singapore Green Economy Agreement,[6] which establishes a framework for enhanced cooperation to grow green sectors and undertake joint projects, was seen as fostering “new habits” of cooperation. At the plurilateral level, relevant initiatives include the following:
An essential foundation for cooperation at the climate-trade nexus—and for accelerating decarbonization more broadly—is the establishment of shared norms and comparable methodologies for carbon accounting.
Issues around emissions accounting were not initially presented for discussion but, in the course of the dialogue, emerged as central to understanding and addressing climate-trade tensions.
Measures that condition the flow of goods on the basis of the direct (and, in some cases, indirect) emissions generated in their production must rely on methodologies for the measurement (or estimation) and verification of these “embedded emissions.” In the absence of broadly agreed-upon approaches, differing and often conflicting methodologies have been introduced by governments and by nongovernmental initiatives aimed at facilitating emissions transparency and reduction. Dialogue participants reported that, increasingly, these divergent approaches present barriers to trade by increasing the cost and complexity of market access, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
The IFCMA, based on an analysis of carbon metrics with an eye toward promoting greater comparability among them, recommended three guiding principles: seeking “proportionality” (an appropriate balance between data accuracy needs and the resources required to meet them), promoting innovation while preserving markets, and fostering interoperability (e.g., via mutual recognition among systems rather than full harmonization).[12]
Alignment on carbon accounting is not a purely technical challenge. Participants from developing countries, emphasizing their limited capacity and infrastructure to measure and track emissions through supply chains, called for greater flexibility in accounting approaches to accommodate such differences. The carbon accounting principles put forward by BRICS countries, citing the UNFCCC principle of CBDR-RC, include principles addressing both equity (“the need for recognition of varying national circumstances, capabilities and responsibilities”) and fairness (putting differing low-emissions pathways “on an equal footing” through “context-aware” requirements that reflect “what is achievable…in a given sector and geographical region”).[13]
A deeper analysis of equity-related issues and options in carbon accounting was a clear priority among participants for achieving broader agreement on managing climate-trade issues.
As more countries move forward with carbon border measures, steps to ensure some form of interoperability will help ease compliance burdens for exporters and avoid unnecessary trade barriers.
Without question, the measure that has generated the greatest attention and resistance is the EU CBAM, which will levy charges on imports in certain carbon-intensive sectors roughly equivalent to those faced by domestic producers under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. In public settings, developing countries, led by the major emerging economies, have steadfastly opposed CBAM-like measures as “green protectionism.”[14]
Yet a more nuanced picture emerged in the dialogue. While some developing country participants voiced strong concerns about specific aspects of the measure, others, from both governments and the private sector, also noted that CBAM has helpfully advanced consideration of carbon pricing options. Indeed, numerous developing countries, including Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam, are moving toward establishing carbon pricing policies—in part to ensure that any carbon revenues generated are retained domestically rather than paid to the EU or another importing country — and some reportedly are considering border measures of their own.[15]
Border measures are at various stages of consideration or adoption in other developed countries as well, including Australia, Canada, and the UK.[16] In the United States, the Trump administration is not openly weighing carbon as a potential factor in its calculation of tariffs. But the Republican-sponsored Foreign Pollution Fee Act recently reintroduced in the US Senate would impose fees on certain imports from countries with higher-emitting industries.[17] The measure differs markedly from the EU CBAM—there would be no corresponding domestic carbon constraint, and the fee would be based on an import’s greenhouse gas intensity rather than a carbon price.
Dialogue participants expressed concern that a growing patchwork of disparate border measures could further fragment global trade, raise costs for businesses, create uncertainties for long-term investment, and hinder the flow of clean technology. Many emphasized the importance of ensuring some measure of “interoperability” among emerging border measure systems to ease compliance, avoid new trade barriers, and maximize climate benefits.
Options presented included an agreed code of conduct, some form of mutual recognition among systems, de minimis standards exempting low-income/low-export countries, and recycling of carbon tariff revenue to support developing country decarbonization. It was suggested that equity-related concerns could be addressed by coupling carbon fees with other measures or partnerships that could help meet developing countries’ capacity and investment needs.
Using sectoral greenhouse gas intensity standards to help decarbonize key sectors offers a promising avenue to align climate and trade objectives.
A discussion of nontariff measures early in the dialogue led to a focus on both challenges and opportunities in the widening use of sustainability standards to manage emissions in key sectors.
While there was broad recognition of the utility of product- and performance-based standards in driving decarbonization, there was also significant concern about the growing profusion of heterogeneous standards, both regulatory and voluntary, across jurisdictions, as well as the divergent carbon accounting and measurement, reporting, and verification methodologies underlying them. Private sector participants emphasized the challenges, especially for small- and medium-sized enterprises, of complying with different standards in different settings and warned of rising barriers to clean trade.
Some developing country participants also expressed the strong view that standards developed in the North, when applied to imports, often fail to account for the differing circumstances of exporting countries. Latin American participants, for instance, objected that measures such as the EU’s Deforestation Regulation do not adequately credit the region’s sustainability assets in their treatment of biomass-based fuels and nature-based carbon removal.
There was strong interest in exploring the potential for closer alignment among standards. Initiatives such as the Carbon Club demonstrate growing convergence around standards in carbon-intensive industrial sectors such as steel and cement.[18] Participants from companies in these and other sectors investing in sustainability said greater consistency and rigor in the application of standards would help justify these investments by ensuring their products earn the “green premium” they embody. It was reported that an emerging coalition of companies seeking to build markets for lower-carbon products and technologies may soon begin advocating for tradable performance-based standards in carbon-intensive sectors.
The general view was that while industry-led standards may be more politically viable in the near term, regulatory backing will likely be required over time to level the playing field and ensure compliance. Many participants also argued that incorporating flexibility for regional differences would help ensure that any emerging framework rewards sustainability rather than geography.
A new “architecture” to manage issues at the climate-trade nexus more effectively and equitably could emerge as a mosaic of bilateral and plurilateral efforts among differing and overlapping groups of countries, which could then inform or evolve into broader multilateral undertakings.
According to many dialogue participants, particularly those from developing countries, climate-trade tensions largely stem from the willingness of some countries to abuse or abandon multilateral norms and institutions, and solutions should ideally be fashioned within the established multilateral order. Yet, given both the fractured state of global relations generally and the particular obstacles faced within the WTO and the UNFCCC, there was simultaneously a broad sense that any overarching multilateral resolution of the conflicts arising at the intersection of climate and trade is unlikely in the near term.
What appears more feasible at this stage is a scaling-up of the types of initiatives now emerging within bilateral and plurilateral settings into a broader constellation of cooperative efforts, each tackling a given aspect of climate-trade relations. Some efforts might address a particular technical, policy, or political dimension—such as accounting methodologies, sectoral standards, or guiding principles—or a combination thereof. Some efforts might arise from a convergence of economic or strategic interests within a given region or among like-minded countries.
In this scenario discussed by participants, there would emerge not a single “architecture” but multiple architectures, ideally more complementary than competing, that can inaugurate and extend shared norms and practices. What such an approach may lack in policy coherence or multilateral embrace, it may make up in political feasibility. And, if successful, it could helpfully inform and, over time, form a stronger political foundation for broader multilateral frameworks.
The dialogue raised several considerations that could be useful in fashioning a next generation of cooperative climate-trade efforts:
An essential next step is a neutral forum bridging climate and trade disciplines, as well as North and South groupings, to deepen mutual understanding of the challenges and opportunities and to seek shared principles and cooperative solutions.
One critical gap identified in the dialogue is a credible, more inclusive forum outside the WTO and the UNFCCC where governments can exchange information and views and explore pathways forward. An “interdisciplinary” forum could straddle and draw expertise from both the climate and trade realms. If thoughtfully designed, it could also reach across the North-South divide, drawing in countries presently siloed in efforts associated more with one camp than another.
Rather than a new standing institution, such a forum could be an interim space for open-ended dialogue. Interested governments, having entered voluntarily, may be less inclined to “escape” by objecting that the issues under discussion belong elsewhere. Any outcomes could serve to inform deliberations and action within established forums or provide a basis for new intergovernmental agreements or initiatives.
According to the participants, one valuable function of such a forum would be to help deescalate climate-trade relations and strengthen the trust needed to achieve cooperative solutions. Identifying common ground on core political issues while making further progress on more technical dimensions could open the way for more effective, inclusive, and equitable approaches. CGEP’s International Dialogue on Climate and Trade, in seeking to advance these aims, can serve as a modest starting point for a fuller effort led by governments to broaden and elevate these critical discussions.
Participants in the Brazil, Singapore, and South Africa workshops conducted during phase one of the International Dialogue on Climate and Trade
Daniel Abdo – VP of International Relations, Sigma Lithium2
Latifah Abdul Latif – Head, Analysis and Monitoring on Finance and Socioeconomic Issues Division, ASEAN Secretariat1
Ella Arnst – Second Secretary (Cyber and Emerging Technology), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand1
Gopalika Arora – Associate Fellow, Centre for Economy and Growth, Observer Research Foundation1
Beth Baltzan – Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council GeoEconomics Center2
George David Banks* – Non-Resident Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, SIPA2, 3
Heidi Barends – Head: Sustainable Finance, Absa3
Eduardo Bastos – Leader, Sustainability Committee, Brazilian Agribusiness Association (ABAG)2
Daniela Baccas – Chief of Sustainability Department, BNDES2
Mathias Becker – Partner, Systemiq2
Dr. Ahmed Khalid Benomar – Senior Advisor, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Kingdom of Morocco3
Jason Bordoff* – Founding Director, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA1, 2
Amb. Liliam Chagas* – Director for Climate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), Brazil2
Serena Chan – Senior Assistant Director, Energy Partnerships Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore2
Carolyn Deere Birkbeck* – Founder and Executive Director, TESS Forum1, 2
Viviana Coelho – Climate Change Executive Manager, Petrobras2
Elliot Diringer – Global Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA1, 2, 3
Jerry Dungu – Head: Market and Product Development, ArcelorMittal South Africa3
Briyid Camila Espinosa – Advisor, Directorate of Productivity and Competitiveness, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Colombia2
Taghareed Elgoweily* – Head, Climate Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt3
Dr. Li Fang – Country Director, WRI China1
Ignacio García Bercero – Non-Resident Fellow, Bruegel2
Victoria Gandini – Counselor, Undersecretariat for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Relations, International Trade and Worship, Argentina2
Dida Gardera – Expert Staff for Connectivity, Service, Development and National Resources, Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, Indonesia1
Hendrik Gordenker – Senior Advisor, JERA1
Peter Govindasamy – Director General (Climate Negotiations), Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore1
Rafaela Guedes – Independent Consultant, Senior Fellow of the Energy Transition Program, CEBRI2
Esther Haerim Heo – Director of Strategy and Development, Solutions for Our Climate2
Christine Harbin* – Policy Advisor, Office of Senator Bill Cassidy, United States Senate2
Chin Heng Ong – Senior Director/Senior State Counsel Attorney-General’s Chambers, Singapore1
Marcus Henry – Assistant Secretary, Green Economy Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia1
Faizel Ismail – Executive Director, Nelson Mandela School of Governance, University of Cape Town3
Michael Ivenso – Director, Energy, Transportation & Infrastructure, National Council on Climate Change, Nigeria3
Thais Jesinski Batista – Projects Manager, Responsible for the Climate Transition and Sustainability Program, CEBRI2
Ma Jun* – Honorary Director General, Beijing Green, Finance Association; Chairman, Green Finance Committee of China Society for Finance and Banking; Founder and President, Institute of Finance and Sustainability3
Andrew Nganga Kamau – Non-Resident Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA3
Jeet Kar – Lead, Sustainable Trade and Global Policy, World Economic Forum2
Kumi Kitamori* – Deputy Director, Environment Directorate, OECD1, 2
David Kleimann – Senior Research Associate, ODI Europe1, 2, 3
Jak Koseff – Senior Manager: Stakeholder Relations, Policy & Advocacy, Sasol3
Deborah Lee – Singapore Government Relations Manager, Public & Government Affairs, ExxonMobil1
Peter Levi – Energy Analyst, Industry, International Energy Agency1
Saul Levin – Executive Director, Trade and Industrial Policy Strategies3
Serena Liau – Deputy Director, International Trade Cluster, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore1
Clarissa Lins – Chair of the Energy Transition Program, CEBRI, Founding Partner, Catavento2
Vivian Mac Knight – General Manager of Climate Change, Vale
Seutame Maimele – Economist: Sustainable Growth, Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies3
Kekelesto Mashigo – Counselor, Economic & Legal, South African Permanent Mission to the WTO3
Bruna Mascotte – Senior Partner, Catavento2
Vitor Mattos Vaz – Focal Point for Trade, Climate Action Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty), Brazil2, 3
Dr. Rose Marie Mendoza – Chief Investment Specialist, Resource-Based Industries Services, Board of Investment of the Philippines2, 3
Diego Mesa Puyo – Deputy Division Chief of the Climate Policy Division, International Monetary Fund2
Xolelwa Mlumbi-Peter* – Deputy Director-General of Trade Branch, Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, South Africa3
Ali Mohamed – Special Climate Change Envoy, Executive Office of the President, Kenya3
Francisco Monge* – Chief Economist, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Costa Rica2
Lutz Morgenstern* – Head of Division, Directorate of International Climate Action & Energy Transition, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK), Germany1*, 2
Lebogang Mulaisi – Executive Manager: Policy & Research, Presidential Climate Commission, South Africa3
Kuben Naidoo* – Head of Corporate Payments, Investec3
Constanza Negri – Head of International Trade and Integration, National Industry Confederation, Brazil2
Cenira Nunes – Global Head, Climate Change, Gerdau2
Arkebe Oqubay – British Academy Global Professor, SOAS University of London3
Hokuto Osaka – Director, International Economic Affairs Department, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan1
Mari Pangestu* – Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA1
Edlayan Passos – Energy Transition and IR Specialist, E+ Energy Transition Institute2
Muhammed Patel – Senior Economist, Sustainable Development, Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies3
Heloisa Pereira – Undersecretary for Trade Policy, Foreign Trade Chamber, Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade, and Services, Brazil1, 2*
Victoria Prado – Research Associate to the Founding Director, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA1, 2, 3
Amb. Fernando Pimentel* – Director of Trade Policy Department, Foreign Trade Chamber, Ministry of Development Industry, Trade and Services, Brazil2
Léa Reichert – Deputy Director of Projects, CEBRI2
Sandra Rios – Director, Center for Integration and Development Studies2
Dr. Vera Rodenhoff* – Deputy Director General for International Climate Action and International Energy Transition, German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE)3
Philippa Rodseth – Executive Director, Manufacturing Circle3
Angélica Romero López – Head of Trade and Sustainable Development, Subsecretariat of International and Economic Relations, Chile2
Gregoire Roos – Head of Political Dialogue & Policy Innovation, BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt1, 2, 3
Georgina Ryan – Director of Environmental Economics, National Treasury, South Africa3
Sagatom Saha – Adjunct Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA1, 2, 3
Toshiyuki Sakamoto – Director, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan1
Harshad Sardeshmukh – Deputy General Manager, Global Corporate Affairs, Tata Sons1
Marcello Schneider – Director for Institutional Relations, BYD2
Thaddeus Segal – Senior Director, Global Energy Transition, ExxonMobil2,3
Mahendra Shunmoogam – Director, International Trade Policy, Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, South Africa3
Li Shuo – Director, China Climate Hub, Asia Society Policy Institute2
Jennifer Smookler – Deputy Director, International Trade, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, United Kingdom2
Mônica Sodré – Senior Fellow, CEBRI2
Thiago Souza da Costa – Head of Network Strategy and Co-Lead Action Platform Brazil, BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt2
Chris Starling – Chief Strategy Officer, JERA Asia2
Trevor Sutton – Director, Program on Trade and the Clean Energy Transition, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA1, 2, 3
Trigg Talley – Director, Climate Negotiations and Programs, Department of State, United States (former)1
Ludvine Tamiotti* – Head of Environment, Trade and Environment Division, World Trade Organization1
Dr. Gwynne Taraska – Independent Consultant, Former Senior Advisor to the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, U.S. Department of State2, 3
Tengo Tengela – Trade & Industrial Policy Coordinator, COSATU3
Thomas J. Trebat – Founding Director, Columbia Global Center, Rio de Janeiro2
David Turk* – Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University, SIPA2
Jo Tyndall – Director of the Environment Directorate, OECD (former)3
Tiffany Vass* – Senior Industry Energy Analyst, International Energy Agency2
Vangelis Vitalis* – Deputy Secretary, Trade and Economic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand1
Ardhi Rasy Wardhana – Senior Assistant, Office of the Presidential Special Envoy for International Trade & Multilateral Cooperation, Indonesia1
Dr. Johanna Wehkamp* – Policy Officer, Department for International Climate Action and International Energy Transition, German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairsand Energy (BMWE)3
Jake Werksman – Principal Advisor for International Aspects of EU Climate Policy, European Commission1, 3
Danielle Yeow – Lead, Climate Law and Policy, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore1
Joanne Yawitch – Head, Just Energy Transition Project, Management Unit, South African Presidency3
Wang Yi – Professor of Energy and Environmental Policy, Institute of Science and Development, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Member, Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress1
Nimrod Zalk* – Chief Research Officer, Climate and Development, Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town1
*virtual participant
[1] participation in the Singapore workshop
[2] participation in the Brazil workshop
[3] participation in the South Africa workshop
The International Dialogue on Climate and Trade is an initiative of the Trade and Clean Energy Transition program, a collaboration of the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) and the Institute of Global Politics (IGP) at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA).
The authors are deeply grateful to the organizations that joined with CGEP in cosponsoring the regional workshops conducted in phase one of the dialogue. This report does not necessarily represent the views of any of these cosponsoring organizations.
The authors are also deeply grateful to the BMW Foundation and Breakthrough Energy for their generous support of the Trade and Clean Energy Transition program and the International Dialogue on Climate and Trade.
Elliot Diringer is a Global Fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), where he directs the Center’s International Dialogue on Climate and Trade. Elliot came to CGEP from the U.S. Department of State, where he served as a Senior Policy Advisor to Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry. In that capacity, he led planning for the Leaders Summit on Climate hosted by President Biden in April 2021 and leader-level meetings of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.
Elliot first focused on climate change as a journalist covering the 1992 Earth Summit for the San Francisco Chronicle. He joined the Clinton White House in 1997, serving as communications director at the Council on Environmental Quality and as a deputy press secretary and deputy assistant to the president. Prior to returning to government, Elliot was executive vice president of the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), formerly the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. He led the Center’s international program from 2001 to 2021, directing dozens of international climate policy studies and regularly convening lead climate negotiators from key countries. He led the influential Climate Dialogue at Pocantico and the Toward 2015 dialogue, which helped build consensus on the conceptual underpinnings of the Paris Agreement.
Elliot is a graduate of Haverford College and was a 1995-96 Nieman Fellow at Harvard University.
Victoria Prado is a Research Associate at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, where she integrates the Trade and Clean Energy Transition initiative and conducts research on the geopolitics of critical minerals in Latin America. She was the first hire at a successful climate startup in Brazil, where she supported investor rounds, led the business intelligence team, and gained hands-on experience with carbon markets in emerging economies. Victoria also worked at the Rockefeller Foundation, advancing projects to expand energy access, accelerate coal phase-out in Southeast Asia, and deploy clean energy storage solutions in sub-Saharan Africa. Her work lies at the intersection of climate policy, sustainable development, and global energy systems, with a regional focus on Latin America. She holds a Master of Science in Sustainability Management from Columbia University and has experience in advising major players in Brazil’s oil, gas, and mining sectors on long-term sustainability strategy.
Trevor Sutton, a Senior Research Associate at CGEP, focuses on the intersection of trade, climate, and industrial policy and leads the center’s Program on Trade and the Clean Energy Transition. Trevor previously served as Research Director of the Remaking Global Trade for a Sustainable Future Project and was a co-author of a seminar report on trade system reform, the Villars Framework for a Sustainable Trade System. He has also served in various roles at the Center for American Progress, most recently as a Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment, and the United Nations. Prior to these positions, Trevor served as a judicial clerk on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Trevor has a BA from Stanford University, a JD from Yale Law School, and an MPhil from Oxford University, where he was a Marshall Scholar.
[1] United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations, 1992), https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.
[2] Michael A. Mehling, “In the Vortex of Great Power Competition: Climate, Trade, and Geostrategic Rivalry in U.S.–China–EU Relations,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, April 2025, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/vortex-great-power-competition-climate-trade-and-geostrategic-rivalry-us-china-eu.
[3] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
[4] World Trade Organization (WTO), “Russia Initiates WTO Dispute Regarding EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment and Emissions Trading,” May 19, 2025, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news25_e/ds639rfc_19may25_e.htm; World Trade Organization, “China Initiates Dispute Regarding US Tax Credits for Electric Vehicles, Renewable Energy,” March 28, 2024, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news24_e/ds623rfc_28mar24_e.htm.
[5] WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (WTO, 1994), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf.
[6] Singapore-Australia Green Economy Agreement (Governments of Australia and Singapore, 2022), https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/singapore/singapore-australia-green-economy-agreement/singapore-australia-green-economy-agreement-text.
[7] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches, https://www.oecd.org/en/about/programmes/inclusive-forum-on-carbon-mitigation-approaches.html.
[8] Climate Club, “The Climate Club,” https://climate-club.org/.
[9] BRICS, Climate Leadership Agenda: Principles for Fair, Inclusive and Transparent Carbon Accounting in Product and Facility Footprints, May 28, 2025, http://brics.br/en/documents/environment-climate-energy-and-disaster-risk-reduction/250528_brics_climate-leadership-agenda_principles-fair-inclusive-transparent-carbon-accounting.pdf/; Ibid., Climate Leadership Agenda: Report on IP Options to Enhance Climate Change Related Technology Cooperation, May 28, 2025, http://brics.br/en/documents/environment-climate-energy-and-disaster-risk-reduction/250528_brics_climate-leadership-agenda_report-on-ip-options.pdf/; Ibid., Climate Leadership Agenda: Terms of Reference of BRICS Laboratory for Trade, Climate Change and Sustainable Development, May 28, 2025, http://brics.br/en/documents/environment-climate-energy-and-disaster-risk-reduction/250528_brics_climate-leadership-agenda_tor-laboratory-trade-climatechange-sustainabledevelopment.pdf/.
[10] G20, G20 Principles on Trade and Sustainable Development (G20, 2024), https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2024-g20-brazil-sherpa-track-trade-and-investment-ministers-miscellaneous-241024-g20-principles-of-trade-and-sustainable-development.
[11] New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS),”https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/agreement-on-climate-change-trade-and-sustainability-accts.
[12] OECD, “Towards More Accurate, Timely, and Granular Product-Level Carbon Intensity Metrics: Challenges and Potential Solutions: An IFCMA Report,” Inclusive Forum on Carbon Mitigation Approaches Papers, no. 4 (OECD, 2024), https://doi.org/10.1787/87bbd6bf-en.
[13] BRICS, Climate Leadership Agenda: Principles for Fair, Inclusive and Transparent Carbon Accounting in Product and Facility Footprints.
[14] Third World Network, “Calls from Developing Countries to Discuss Unilateral Measures,” November 29, 2024, https://twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2024/cc241117.htm#:~:text=One%20such%20measure%20cited%20by%20developing%20countries,fora%20is%20the%20World%20Trade%20Organisation%20%5BWTO%5D.
[15] Government of Brazil, “President Lula Signs Law Creating Regulated Carbon Market in Brazil,” December 12, 2024, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/12/president-lula-signs-law-creating-regulated-carbon-market-in-brazil; Argus, “Indonesia Developing ETS Ahead of EU CBAM Introduction,” April 25, 2024, https://www.argusmedia.com/zh/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2681354-indonesia-developing-ets-ahead-of-eu-cbam-introduction; Aliana Zulaika Yeong, “Malaysia Sets 2026 Carbon Tax, Reaffirms Decarbonization Goals in Budget 2025,” S&P Global, October 21, 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/energy-transition/102124-malaysia-sets-2026-carbon-tax-reaffirms-decarbonization-goals-in-budget-2025; Ivy Yin, “Vietnam Expedites Domestic Carbon Market Development to Tackle CBAM, Article 6,” S&P Global, May 24, 2024, https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/energy-transition/052424-vietnam-expedites-domestic-carbon-market-development-to-tackle-cbam-article-6.
[16] Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, Australian Government, Carbon Leakage Review, Consultation Paper 2 (November 2024), https://storage.googleapis.com/files-au-climate/climate-au/p/prj2f030fe5577e16a3ffbb9/page/Carbon_Leakage_Review_Consultation_Paper_2_November_2024.pdf; Government of Canada, Department of Finance, Exploring Border Carbon Adjustments for Canada, last modified January 14, 2025, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/consultations/2021/border-carbon-adjustments/exploring-border-carbon-adjustments-canada.html; UK Government, HM Treasury, “Factsheet: Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism,” April 24, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/factsheet-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism-cbam/factsheet-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism.
[17] US Congress, S.1325—Foreign Pollution Fee Act of 2025, introduced April 8, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1325/text.
[18] Climate Club, Climate Club Members Statement, delivered November 12, 2024, https://climate-club.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/ClimateClub_memberstatement_COP29.pdf. See also International Energy Agency, “Definitions for Near-Zero and Low-Emissions Steel and Cement, and Underlying Emissions Measurement Methodologies,” November 8, 2024, https://www.iea.org/reports/definitions-for-near-zero-and-low-emissions-steel-and-cement-and-underlying-emissions-measurement-methodologies.
In the last six weeks, the Chinese government has made several bold moves related to its trade relations.
The global clean energy economy today looks starkly different than it did even 10 years ago. Not only have production and deployment of clean energy technologies expanded significantly, the geographic distribution of clean energy manufacturers, resellers, and end-users has shifted dramatically.
The new critical minerals agreement between Japan and the US is more than yet another bilateral trade announcement.
Full report
Summaries by Elliot Diringer, Victoria Barreto Vieira do Prado & Trevor Sutton • October 21, 2025