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The Trump administration may release a blueprint for a US sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in early May after the president signed an executive order in February giving the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce 90 days to develop a plan.
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The Trump administration may release a blueprint for a US sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in early May after the president signed an executive order in February giving the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce 90 days to develop a plan.
It’s unclear whether the plan will be completed on time in May or released to the public, but the creation of such a fund could play a meaningful role in US strategic influence and economic statecraft. The notion of a US SWF, which precedes Trump’s pledge, has already sparked debate over how the fund would be capitalized, what strategic aims it would serve, and how it should be governed.
While a US SWF has the potential to advance several critical strategic objectives, the results it delivers will ultimately be a function of its design and mandate. This blog explores a few formulations that the United States SWF might follow with regard to its objectives and funding sources. In addition, the piece discusses the governance approach that the SWF would need to counter concerns about potential political conflicts.
If established with clear objectives and robust oversight, and if it is closely coordinated with an upgraded International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and a mission-focused Loan Programs Office (LPO), a federal sovereign wealth fund could fill financing gaps where private incentives diverge from national interests. Such an instrument could complement market forces in sectors where supply-chain security and strategic competition demand more deliberate statecraft, such as AI, chips, and critical minerals, among others.
Common SWF models
Globally, SWFs—state-owned investment vehicles that manage national public assets—have emerged as powerful tools for achieving strategic goals, nearly doubling in size over the past decade to over $13 trillion. SWFs in just five countries—China, UAE, Norway, Singapore, and Saudi Arabia—account for three-quarters of these assets. In the United States, several state-level funds exist, most notably in Alaska, Texas, and New Mexico, but there is no federal SWF.
These funds differ considerably in terms of purpose, funding sources, and governance. Some pursue strategic influence while others long-term savings; some are transparent and independently managed, while others are state-led with limited disclosures—each shaped by domestic politics.
A US fund could fall into one of three broad categories common to SWFs globally: a stabilization fund, a savings fund, or a strategic fund. Each model has different goals and implications for how the fund would be capitalized, governed, and deployed.
Stabilization funds are designed to lower the volatility of government budget revenues, especially when they are tied to commodity exports. For example, Chile’s SWF aims to smooth revenues from copper exports. A savings or pension reserve fund focuses on long-term wealth accumulation, such as Norway’s SWF, which invests oil revenues mostly in assets abroad, to benefit future generations. Finally, strategic or development funds aim to promote national policy goals, such as China’s CIC and Singapore’s Temasek, which support economic diplomacy and innovation.
A stabilization or savings fund does not appear to be well-aligned with the US economic structure and institutional framework. Stabilization funds are common in net energy-exporting nations with centralized control over resource rents. While the US is a major energy producer, it does not consolidate oil revenues at the federal level in a way that supports this model.
Similarly, permanent savings or intergenerational wealth funds require sustained budget surpluses and political consensus—conditions not currently present in the United States.
Purposes for a US SWF
Trump administration officials have presented the SWF as a vehicle for supporting strategic investments to advance national economic priorities, including investments in strategic supply chains. Among the sectors of concern, there is a bipartisan agreement that critical minerals stand out due to US import dependence and their importance to defense, clean energy, and advanced manufacturing. The idea echoes aspects of China’s CIC, which, while return-focused, has at times aligned its investments with broader national policy goals.
Successive US administrations have sought financial tools to compete with China’s global investment campaigns. Over the past two decades, China has committed more than $800 billion to overseas development and infrastructure finance, largely through its Belt and Road Initiative, which has far outpaced similar efforts by the United States. An SWF could aim to close that strategic gap by investing more flexibly not only in domestic infrastructure but also in allied or contested geographies.
Some policymakers have pointed to existing federal investment tools as potential building blocks or complements to a US sovereign wealth fund. The United States already operates several mission-driven investment tools, including the DFC and the Department of Energy’s LPO. The DFC supports development and strategic infrastructure abroad, while the LPO provides loans and loan guarantees primarily to support innovations in clean energy and transportation.
The DFC, with an investment cap of $60 billion, and the DOE LPO, with over $400 billion in loan authority, are significant but more narrowly scoped tools constrained by specific mandates and administrative processes that are misaligned with fast-moving diplomatic efforts. A sovereign wealth fund could provide a complementary mechanism, enabling larger-scale, faster, and potentially more flexible capital deployment across borders or strategic sectors.
Potential funding sources for a US SWF
It is also not clear how the United States would fund an SWF. SWFs are typically funded from a combination of current account surpluses (e.g., China), fiscal surpluses (e.g., Singapore), commodity export receipts (e.g., the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Chile), privatization receipts, and public savings. The United States lacks the typical preconditions for creating an SWF as the country imports more than it exports and runs persistent budget deficits.
A few proposals to capitalize a federal SWF by leveraging public assets have surfaced as part of early planning discussions.
One option that has been proposed by some current and former administration officials, among others, would be to revalue the 8,133 metric tons of gold reserves held by the US Treasury at a statutory book value of just $11 billion, but potentially worth over $900 billion at current market prices. Another potential source is tariff revenues, which generated over $80 billion in 2023 and could rise further under newly announced tariffs affecting almost all countries. The government could also raise revenues by selling federal land and mineral rights.
While the liquidity, political feasibility, and scale of these assets vary, they underscore a broader willingness to consider underutilized public resources.
Governance structure
A federal sovereign wealth fund in the United States would face serious governance and political-economy risks. The suggestion that the US SWF might be used to acquire TikTok underscores how quickly perceptions of cronyism can eclipse policy goals. The examples of Norway and Singapore are instructive, as SWFs in both countries have achieved commercial success while avoiding politicization.
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global integrates sound control and supervisory bodies at every management level, and Singapore’s Temasek adheres to core principles of non-intervention and non-preference. A US fund operating at the intersection of industrial, foreign-policy, and budget politics would need similar strong oversight without direct political interference to promote independence and protect from the pressures of political cycles.
Well-designed guardrails are therefore indispensable, as other experts have suggested. An independent, Senate-confirmed board—its members serving staggered terms and removable only for cause—would help insulate the fund from day-to-day political swings while preserving accountability. Pairing that governance with a dual mandate of market-level returns and measurable progress in a well-defined roster of national interest sectors would focus strategy, with the need for congressional approval for any venture beyond that core list to help keep mission creep in check. Norway-style transparency—routine disclosure of holdings, audited statements, and oversight by the US Government Accountability Office—would provide the visibility needed to deter opportunism. Folding deals into existing national-security reviews, such as those conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the outbound-investment screen, would integrate the fund’s activity into the broader security architecture.
Ultimately, these three factors—credible oversight, clear priorities, and disciplined execution—should going a long way in determining the success of a US sovereign wealth fund.
Foundations and Individual Donors Anonymous Anonymous Aphorism Foundation the bedari collective Children’s Investment Fund Foundation David Leuschen Mike and Soa Segal Kimberly and Scott Sheffield Bernard and Anne Spitzer Charitable Trust Ray Rothrock
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