Chinese mineral export controls to spell shortages, long-term questions
Chinese mineral export controls to spell shortages, long-term questions
Full report
Mexico’s Deepwater Auctions
Commentary by , , • January 09, 2017
Energy Explained
Get the latest as our experts share their insights on global energy policy.
The Elements of Sanctions Ripe for Reform
Economic statecraft, and sanctions in particular, are popular policy instruments because they promise to deliver leverage at someone else’s expense. Sanctions can create pressure by taking away something...
Podcasts
Hear in-depth conversations with the world’s top energy and climate leaders from government, business, academia, and civil society.
COP29: A Veteran’s Account of the UN Process
The international climate negotiation process stands at a critical juncture. At the recent COP29 summit in Azerbaijan, nations struggled to find common ground on financial support and carbon...
[DOWNLOAD THE FULL COMMENTARY HERE]
Summary
On December 5, 2016, the Mexican government auctioned eleven deep- and ultra-deepwater blocks in the Gulf of Mexico in a bidding round known as Round 1.4. Seven operators won, all credible, highly experienced oil majors and large international exploration and production companies. Fellow Adrián Lajous, former CEO of Pemex, explores the efficacy of opening the Mexican upstream to private investment, looking at deepwater Round 1.4 and the limits and shortcomings of its execution.
Despite naïve optimism with respect to production and reserve replacement, as well as the short- and mid-term impact of upstream reform from 2013 energy reform policies in the country, Lajous indicates Mexico is now experiencing a major discontinuity in its oil and gas industry — a new industrial structure ending a long-established state monopoly. He notes that although Pemex and the Mexican government view the Round 1.4 process and its results as a major success, the timing and sequencing of Round 1 auctions were severely affected by deteriorating global oil industry conditions; compounding impacts of low prices and falling oil production on public finance, and particularly on the financial position of Pemex, forced the oil industry to limit debt and drastically cut expenditures. Lajous recommends that the mid-term consequences of these constraints should not be underestimated and a more rigorous selection of assets, coupled with a slower-paced calendar, could have offered better results, and simultaneously allowed the global oil industry to begin its recovery from what has been a taxing crisis.
Relevant
Publications
India’s Ambitious Green Steel Plan Hinges on Mitigating Coal
Amid plans to nearly double its steel production capacity by 2030 to serve its growing infrastructure needs, the world’s No. 2 steel producer India[1] has released plans to...
Triggering Investment in First-of-a-Kind and Early Near-Zero Emissions Industrial Facilities
This report explores financial policy instruments that can make first-of-a-kind (FOAK) near-zero emission industrial facilities viable.
Reports
by Chris Bataille, Seton Stiebert, Jonas Algers + 2 more • August 01, 2024
Response to DOE Request for Feedback on New Zero Emissions Building Definition
The following document includes the responses submitted to the Department of Energy following the request for information on proposed national definition of a zero emissions building.
Summaries
by Harry Kennard • February 22, 2024
