The Israeli-led military campaign against Iran’s nuclear and missile programs (primarily) was broadly successful. It remains unclear whether Iran retains the ability to develop nuclear weapons quickly; consequently, it is hard to say whether the campaign was solely a tactical success or also a strategic one. But it dealt Iran a blow that will probably take years to repair if the country chooses to reconstitute those programs essentially as they were prior to June 12.
Military success has raised questions as to whether sanctions or even a negotiated agreement still have a role to play in deterring Iranian nuclear proliferation. President Trump himself suggested sanctions were no longer relevant when — flush from US military strikes on Iran and subsequent cease-fire — he messaged on Truth Social that “China can now continue to purchase Oil from Iran,” though this statement was eventually walked back by other US officials. But if Israeli and US strikes denied Iran a nuclear weapon and both countries remain committed to using force against Iran again were it to reconstitute the program, then why not drop the sanctions regime, especially those measures intended to target the nuclear program? Trump has fed into this logic repeatedly since returning to office and since the strikes.
Sanctions against Iran continue to have both tactical and strategic significance in denying Iran the ability to pursue nuclear weapons. In fact, in many ways, the destruction of Iran’s previous nuclear program is more reason to ensure that widespread sanctions on Iranian nuclear and missile procurements are fully implemented. This includes reimposing United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran via the “snapback” mechanism (a part of the 2015 nuclear deal that allows for any deal participant to reimpose UNSC sanctions) unless a new nuclear deal can be reached with Iran quickly.
Strategic Value Unchanged
Iran continues to face the same strategic choice that it has since the first meaningful sanctions on its nuclear program were imposed by the United States in 2005: is it worth the cost to our economy and our country more generally to pursue nuclear capabilities that can create nuclear weapons? Iran’s eventual answer after a decade’s worth of mounting pressure was that it was prepared to set aside some of its nuclear ambitions for a significant length of time in exchange for sanctions relief, in the form of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
There is no reason to believe that this construct for evaluating Iranian decision-making has lost potency inside Iran, even if there are more voices today advocating Iran move to create nuclear weapons than there were in the past. In fact, the elimination of billions in nuclear investments in Iran during the conflict has probably intensified the sense of trade-off that exists, adding to the lost value of the trade and development benefits that would have come by avoiding sanctions in the first place. Rather than consider whether to build a nuclear program while pressure mounts, Iran now must find the resources to rebuild a nuclear program while pressure is maintained.
Moreover, while neither the Biden nor the Trump administration significantly intensified the maximum pressure campaign, its latent damage remains substantial. The original sanctions ramp up took eight years (2005–13, when negotiations began on the JCPOA). The current maximum pressure campaign — which was the re-establishment of the high-water mark of sanctions suspended in 2015 — has been in place since 2018. The cumulative effect of those sanctions is being felt in Iran, as can be seen especially in the diminished state of its infrastructure like electricity supply.
Iran is probably debating the cost of its nuclear program (and associated weapons option) as it considers its overall response to the conflict and offer of negotiations. It is not clear yet what conclusions it will reach, including on whether Iran’s security requirements demand reconstitution of its nuclear program. But removing sanctions now (as Trump appeared willing to do in June) or letting their efficacy diminish in the absence of a deal will not help in reinforcing to Iran the folly of its nuclear pursuits.
Tactical Value Enhanced
In fact, sanctions are probably more important today as part of a broad effort to deny Iran the ability to reconstitute its nuclear program. Iran likely has a store of materials for producing uranium centrifuge and other nuclear components. But some of those materials may also have been damaged as part of the overall nuclear enterprise in the Israeli-American strikes. As with Iran’s efforts to rebuild its missile program after the November 2024 conflict with Israel, Iran will probably need to look to international supply if it wants to obtain materials that it can use in its nuclear and missile programs. Denying Iran those components is a necessary element of ensuring that the strikes against Iran’s nuclear and missile program retain their strategic value. If the strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program by 1 to 2 years, then it is in the US interest to keep it there.
Toward this end, although it may continue to prioritize economic sanctions enforcement (as it has for the last decade), the United States could consider concentrating intelligence, diplomatic, and enforcement resources on preventing the shipment of cargoes that could help Iran in any reconstitution drive. If a single shipment of Iranian oil goes unmarked, the strategic consequences for the sanctions campaign would be slight; by contrast, a single shipment of carbon fiber getting through could be the key to Iran reconstituting its nuclear program in shorter order.
Trigger Snapback, Take It Seriously
Snapback of UN sanctions is a crucial part of this effort. It is reasonable to be skeptical of the value of reimposed UN sanctions, given the enforcement challenges that will exist and the fact that these measures do not directly target the Iranian economy. But the strategic value of UN sanctions is greater today, first, because they concentrate on denying Iran access to goods and services that support its nuclear and missile programs and, second, because they apply equally on all UN member states. For example, states will be obligated to inspect aircraft and ships carrying Iran-bound illicit cargo if confronted with credible evidence of their illicit nature. Even if Russia, China, or North Korea were to seek to evade these sanctions, they would have a harder time convincing other states to break them. This dimension will add credibility to the US sanctions enforcement drive and complicate the Iranian reconstitution effort.
Iran fears snapback of UNSC sanctions on both practical and political grounds, and has threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty should snapback occur. But practically speaking, this threat has less value after Iran reduced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in response to Israeli and US strikes. IAEA inspectors are already unable to do their jobs and making this more formal does not carry the same danger as it would have before the June conflict.
