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Summaries by Matt Bowen, Jonathan Elkind, Gautam Jain + 2 more • August 25, 2025
This event summary reflects the authors’ understanding of key points made in the course of the discussion. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Center on Global Energy Policy. The summary may be subject to further revision.
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Top discussion points
On July 22, 2025, the Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) at Columbia University SIPA hosted a virtual roundtable under the Chatham House Rule on the World Bank’s June 2025 announcement that it would reverse a long-standing, informal policy of excluding nuclear projects from its lending portfolio—a move that has propelled other international finance institutions, notably the Asian Development Bank, to explore similar steps.[1] Bringing together current and former US government officials as well as individuals from multilateral development banks, private financial institutions, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, legal and advisory firms, and academic institutions, the event focused on the policy context for this development, its potential implications, and possible next steps for materializing the financial support. This roundtable report summarizes the discussion that took place.
Participants discussed the multi-year effort to overturn the World Bank’s informal ban on nuclear energy and how it ultimately succeeded. One participant shared that this effort was driven by the realization that global climate and development goals could not be met without nuclear power. This person observed that while many countries—especially those interested in advanced nuclear technologies—were supportive of a policy change, the latter faced resistance from certain European shareholders led by Germany, whose opposition carried weight due to the World Bank’s consensus-based decision-making approach, which allows any country to block or slow down progress on an issue. The participant observed that the effort to revisit the World Bank’s stance on nuclear energy was bolstered by the White House’s ongoing reassessment of future US engagement with international institutions, which created pressure on the World Bank to adopt measures such as this one that could improve its standing in Washington.
Another participant brought up two current restrictions that explicitly exclude nuclear energy. The first was established as part of a 2013 plan for universal access to electricity by 2030,[2] and states that the World Bank does not support work on nuclear because of its lack of expertise in nuclear technology. The second was within the division that lends to private entities, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which maintains a list of activities and projects the World Bank is not allowed to invest in, including any involving radioactive materials. According to this participant, these policies are now being amended to remove these restrictions. The participant noted that given the IFC’s exclusion list is widely used by at least 21 other financial institutions, changing it could have a ripple effect across the development finance ecosystem.
Apart from explicit policies, one participant noted that past presidents of the World Bank have stated publicly that the institution does not support nuclear energy projects,[3] which had a chilling effect among the staff who were then hesitant to raise the topic.
Participants identified several possible avenues for the World Bank to promote nuclear energy, including: building capacity and training tools for countries that do not have a nuclear program but are starting to set up the legal and regulatory apparatus to develop one; helping develop the fuel value chain, including uranium mining and conversion; accelerating the development and deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs); de-risking early-stage nuclear investments to attract private capital by using the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds[4]; and financing long-term operations of existing plants. On this last point, one participant noted that an early opportunity for the World Bank is to help safely extend the life of existing nuclear power plants in middle-income economies, where the investment needs are more clearly defined. They mentioned that, in addition to prior reticence by the World Bank, the relatively high cost of nuclear energy has been a deterrent, especially as cheaper sources of energy are available.
Several participants agreed that a critical next step is for the World Bank and other MDBs to develop internal expertise on nuclear energy, including by hiring more people with a nuclear science background. One participant noted that the World Bank will need to understand better the new generation of nuclear technologies, including their financial, safety, security, and governance dimensions. Another participant emphasized that while nuclear power will not be appropriate for every country, there is evidence that many countries—including several in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa—are moving forward with plans for their first reactors. In this participant’s view, MDBs already advise these countries on infrastructure, and they will need to get up to speed to provide credible guidance on technologies and investment frameworks and address questions that are likely to come from civil society.
Several participants stressed that this capacity building could be kick-started through a trust fund, possibly established by legislation currently under discussion in the US Congress.[5] They felt that while donations from other countries would be needed, such a fund could help bring in the expertise to provide advice to countries and for MDBs to make the necessary investments.
Some participants suggested that it would be a positive step for the Climate Investment Funds to get engaged in early-stage technology development for nuclear power, as the World Bank has limited capacity to provide grants.
Participants also discussed a recent, related announcement of a partnership between the World Bank and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to support the safe, secure, and responsible use of nuclear energy in developing countries.[6] Some saw a need to build technical and institutional capacity among countries—particularly in Africa—that do not currently operate nuclear power plants but are interested in doing so to enable fully informed decisions on whether to adopt nuclear energy. The IAEA has already been working with around 37 such countries, providing training and tools to support national energy planning that incorporates nuclear development, and is thus already well positioned to assist the World Bank with this effort. Participants discussed how this new collaboration could help ensure that countries considering nuclear energy have the necessary knowledge before reaching the investment or deployment stage.
One participant identified the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) as another institution with which the World Bank could partner. In their view, the DFC is already building up its resources in nuclear energy by hiring people with the appropriate background. In addition, the DFC can make equity investments with a stake of up to 30 percent, capped at $100 million, and debt investments of up to $1 billion. The institution is already supporting uranium projects in Africa, which would be complementary.
Participants noted that joint financing with other development banks―such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)―may be needed to support nuclear projects, given their high capital investment needs.
One participant pointed to challenges related to the World Bank’s preferred creditor status (PCS), which grants it priority in repayment over other lenders. While this status protects the World Bank’s financial position, it may limit its ability to co-finance nuclear projects with export credit agencies (ECAs), which have historically financed large-scale nuclear projects. In this individual’s view, for ECAs to work as a partner, the World Bank would likely need to waive its PCS, which would raise legal and policy questions that would need to be resolved. The participant commented that addressing these issues is critical to enabling large, syndicated financing packages for nuclear projects.
Participants raised an additional concern about the growing influence of state-subsidized firms from China and Russia in global nuclear procurement, particularly within developing countries. One participant suggested that the World Bank should proceed thoughtfully with its financing of nuclear power to ensure that it does not accidentally favor Russia’s and China’s subsidized firms.
Another participant assessed that for countries in Africa considering a new nuclear program, the default is to obtain a package deal from Russia or China―meaning one that includes all the necessary components, including the reactor, the fuel supply, and financing. They compared this with the more “à la carte” US or Western style of nuclear support where the recipient country must assemble all the pieces themselves, including the financing. This participant thought that the World Bank must be very firm on the need for open, competitive procurements, and the United States should seek support from other countries in this regard lest some nations sign secret deals with Russian or Chinese state-owned entities. Another participant thought the World Bank should focus on promoting transparency in the nuclear sector and helping countries understand that choosing a Russian reactor with a 40- or 50-year fuel agreement would have implications for both their energy security and their national security.
One participant referenced a Government Accountability Office report[7] that found businesses in China had been awarded almost 30 percent of the contract dollars associated with the financing provided to low- and middle-income countries by the World Bank. They observed that in their experience, given the extent of subsidies provided by China, some US firms do not even bid, perceiving the process to be unfair and noncompetitive. The participant discussed the possibility of a policy that would cap any one country’s percentage of contract dollars associated with World Bank lending, and also pondered whether the World Bank or other MDBs could disallow procurement from countries that have not signed the OECD anti-bribery convention, which they assessed China and Russia would likely not.
Participants concluded the discussion with calls for realism and patience. While the World Bank’s policy shift on nuclear is a significant step―in terms of both financial potential and possible implications for public acceptance―many emphasized that progress on actual investments will be gradual. Drawing from the experience of the DFC, which overturned its ban on nuclear financing five years ago but has yet to fund a project, participants cautioned against expecting an immediate pipeline of nuclear projects supported by the World Bank. Instead, they stressed the importance of developing technical capacity, safety expertise, regulatory institutions, and other early-stage support. Initial investments in feasibility studies and building regulatory capacity could help unlock larger commercial financing years from now, such as lifetime extensions and new deployments.
[1] Jamie Smyth and Harry Dempsey, “Asian Development Bank Mulls Lifting Nuclear Power Funding Ban,” Financial Review, June 16, 2026, https://www.afr.com/world/asia/asian-development-bank-mulls-lifting-nuclear-power-funding-ban-20250616-p5m7u5. The US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) already revised its nuclear financing policy in 2020, allowing support for nuclear energy projects in emerging and frontier markets.
[2] John Upton, “World Bank Says No to Nuclear as It Lays Out Universal Energy Plan,” Grist, November 28, 2013, https://grist.org/climate-energy/world-bank-says-no-to-nuclear-as-it-lays-out-universal-energy-plan/.
[3] Phys.org, “World Bank Says No Money for Nuclear Power,” November 27, 2013, https://phys.org/news/2013-11-world-bank-money-nuclear-power.html.
[4] Climate Investment Funds website: https://www.cif.org/.
[5] International Nuclear Energy Financing Act, S. 1739, 119th Cong. (2025), https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1739/text; International Nuclear Energy Financing Act, H.R. 1474, 119th Cong. (2025), https://www.congress.gov/119/bills/hr1474/BILLS-119hr1474rh.pdf.
[6] World Bank, “World Bank Group, IAEA Formalize Partnership to Collaborate on Nuclear Energy for Development,” June 26, 2025, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/06/26/world-bank-group-iaea-formalize-partnership-to-collaborate-on-nuclear-energy-for-development.
[7] Government Accountability Office, “Borrower Countries’ Contracts to Businesses in the U.S. and to Entities Potentially on U.S. Sanctions or Other Lists of Concern,” May 10, 2023, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105543.
This special CGEP blog series, featuring six contributions from CGEP scholars, analyzes the potential impacts of the OBBBA across a range of sectors.
Full report
Summaries by Matt Bowen, Jonathan Elkind, Gautam Jain + 2 more • August 25, 2025